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 2 
Abstract: The weighted voting system used by the International Monetary Fund creates 
problems of democratic legitimacy since each member's influence or voting power is not 
in general equal to its voting weight. Using voting power analysis to analyse both the 
Board of Governors and the Executive Board, we show that it tends to enhance the power 
of the United States at the expense of all other members. We investigate the constituency 
system as a form of representative democracy, idealizing it as a compound voting body, 
and find that it gives disproportionately large power to some smaller European countries, 
particularly Belgium and Netherlands. We also find that many countries are effectively 
disenfranchised. Separate analyses are done for 2006 and 2012, before and after recent 
reforms, which have been billed as being radical, enhancing the voice of the poor and 
emerging markets, but the effects are disappointingly small.
 1 
1. Introduction  
The governance of the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank) is by means of a system of weighted voting. All member 
countries have a voice but cast different numbers of votes depending on their quotas 
(the IMF term for the country’s financial stake), or their shareholdings (the term used 
by the World Bank). In the IMF each country’s number of votes is determined by a 
formula that gives it a number of so-called basic votes that each country has plus a 
number proportional to its quota.
1
 The rules require that all countries that are 
members of the World Bank must also be members of the IMF, and their 
shareholdings depend very strongly on their IMF quotas. It is therefore not necessary 
to make separate analyses of voting power for the two institutions and our findings 
about the IMF can therefore be taken as broadly applying to the World Bank also. 
Weighted voting in the IMF is problematic because it results in a severe 
democratic imbalance with the distribution of voting power being massively biased 
against the developing and poor countries. This dominance by the industrialized 
countries has been criticised by the developing countries and others as leading the 
organization to adopt policies that have taken insufficient notice of the interests of 
those countries, especially the imposition of conditions on borrowers derived from 
extreme neo-liberal economics in the so-called Washington Consensus. (See eg. 
Buira, 2003, Woods, 2006.) The need for reform of the governance of the 
international financial organisations was accepted by all countries as part of the 
Monterrey Consensus agreed in 2002 and again at the follow-up meeting in Doha in 
                                                 
1
 One vote for every 100,000 special drawing rights of quota. Each country’s quota is 
its financial stake in the IMF and theoretically meant to reflect its importance in the 
world economy. 
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2008. Changes aimed at giving greater voice to poor countries and emerging 
economies have now started to be implemented and it is of interest to study how 
effective they are. 
Besides this inequality in the voting arrangements – inequality that has 
historically been intended as part of the design of an institution on the principle that 
those who contribute most should have the most say - there exists a further bias, 
resulting from the use of weighted voting.  The idea of weighted voting is that each 
country’s voting power should be predetermined and that it should be proportional to 
its voting weight.  However, a member’s voting power is not the same as its weight: 
its power is its ability to be decisive whenever a vote is taken – to make a difference 
to the outcome - whereas its weight is just the number of votes it has been allocated 
by the rules.   
It follows that voting power is a fundamental property of the rules by which 
decisions are taken, together with the weights of all voters, and this can only be 
revealed by detailed analysis that looks at outcomes, using voting power indices, 
Because this important distinction is often ignored in practice, designing constitutions 
that use weighted voting often leads to undesired or unexpected consequences in 
terms of the distribution of voting power among countries. 
The voting weights in the IMF are very unequal: the USA has more than two 
and a half times as many votes as the country with the next-largest voting weight, 
Japan. We use power indices to measure each member’s voting power. The USA 
turns out to have much more voting power than weight. This disproportionality is 
another argument for reforming the weights in a more radical direction than has 
 3 
hitherto been suggested. More generally the lack of a direct link between power and 
weight adds to the case for decoupling the allocation of votes from both the provision 
of and access to finance. 
Defenders of the present voting system claim it embodies democratic 
accountability if one accepts the principle that voting rights should be attached to the 
supply of capital. For example, when he was Managing Director Horst Köhler said: “I 
would also like to underline that still we are a financial institution, and a financial 
institution means you need also to have someone who provides capital and I think 
there is a healthy element in the fact that the provision of capital and voting rights is, 
in a way, combined, because this is also an element of efficiency, of accountability.”2 
The distorting effect of weighted voting that we describe below makes this claim far 
from being true.  
As a general principle weighted voting is an attractive idea because it offers 
the prospect of designing an intergovernmental decision-making body that could have 
a real claim to democratic legitimacy – for example, in an institution of world 
government where a country’s voting power reflects its population. But it is important 
to be clear about what we mean by weighted voting. Systems based on the use of a 
bloc vote where a country (or group of countries acting together) casts all its voting 
weight as a single unit, as in the IMF, cannot be relied on to work like that and in 
general they do not, as we will show. On the other hand, if the rules are such that a 
country is represented by a number of delegates each with one vote that they are 
allowed to cast individually, rather than having to vote together as a unit, then this 
problem does not arise. The latter is simply a representative democracy and the 
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 House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, 4
th 
July 2002. 
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number of votes or delegates is equivalent to the country’s power. The argument we 
are advancing here is only relevant when the votes cannot be split.  
We will use the method of voting power analysis to explore the relationships 
between the voting weights, the decision rule and the resulting voting powers of the 
members. This requires us to analyse all the voting outcomes that can occur, and 
investigate the ability of every member to be decisive, to be able to decide whether 
the vote leads to a decision or not. We will use voting power indices to compare the 
powers of different members.  
Our principal finding is that the voting power of the USA is far greater than its 
voting weight. That is, its actual power over decision-making far exceeds its nominal 
voting power. We also use the method for two important analyses: first the effect of 
the ad hoc increase in voting weight that occurred in 2008 for four emerging 
economies (China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey) that were previously very badly 
unrepresented, second the more radical reforms agreed at the Singapore meeting in 
2008. Secondly we consider the Executive Board as a representative body in which 
the directors are elected by constituencies of countries by majority voting. We find 
that the constituency system considerably enhances the power of certain smaller 
European countries, especially Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland.  
We begin with an outline of the principles of voting power analysis in the next 
section. Then in section 3 the system of governance of the IMF is described, in 
sections 4 and 5 we present the analyses of the Board of Governors and the Executive 
Directors, in 6 we consider the voting power implications for treating the constituency 
system that underpins the Executive Board as form of democratic representation 
 5 
assuming formal voting within constituencies. 
 
2. Weighted Voting and Voting Power Analysis 
A country’s voting power is its potential to be decisive in a decision taken by 
vote, measured by the probability with which it can change what would otherwise be 
a losing vote to a winning one. In general this has a rather imprecise relation with its 
weight. In reality its power depends on all the other members’ weights as well as the 
voting rule by which decisions are taken. A case that shows the issue starkly is that of 
the European Economic Community which also employed weighted voting in the 
council of ministers: the distribution of voting power among the six members was far 
from proportional to voting weight between 1958 and 1972. See Leech and Leech 
(2005b) for the details. (Brams and Affuso,1976, were the first to show it.)  
By considering all possible voting outcomes the method of power indices is 
technically that of a priori voting power: each member’s power index is its 
decisiveness as a fraction of the theoretically possible outcomes without regard for the  
likelihood of their occurring. The method can be thought of as an analysis of the 
implications for power of the voting rules, considered in the abstract, as giving what 
can be called constitutional power
3
. Probability calculus is used as a tool for 
calculating the power indices. Technically the probability of a voter being decisive is 
the Penrose index (also known equivalently as the Penrose measure, Penrose-Banzhaf 
index, Absolute Banzhaf index).  This is a measure of the a priori probability of the 
voter being decisive and is the simplest index for the purpose. Other power indices 
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 No consideration is given here for the members’ preferences, which would 
determine the likelihood of particular members voting in the same way as each other, 
which would produce an analysis of empirical voting power. Some coalitions look 
less likely than others from a game-theoretic point of view. Such an analysis is 
beyond the scope of the present study.  
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could be used, but we take the view that the superiority of the Penrose-Banzhaf index 
is established on both theoretical and empirical grounds. See Felsenthal and 
Machover (1998), Leech (2002c) for a comparison with the other so-called classical 
power index, the Shapley-Shubik; see also Coleman (1971).  However since our 
purpose is to investigate changes in relative voting power among the member 
countries, we use the normalized version, generally known as the Banzhaf index (or 
Normalised Banzhaf index), that has the property that the indices over all the voters 
sum to one, and therefore it provides a distribution of voting power. We will refer to 
values of this index as voting powers. 
Voting power analysis will be used in two ways. First it will be used to 
analyse power relations in the existing governance structures of the IMF, the Board of 
Governors and the Executive Board, and also the effects of recent reforms. These will 
be the main empirical results of the paper.  
Second, we also use it to study the properties of indirect or two-level voting 
procedures implied by the IMF constituency system where countries are placed in a 
series of groups, each containing a number of members, where each group’s 
Executive Director casts all its members’ votes en bloc in the second stage the 
Executive. The Penrose index described above provides a simple methodology for 
doing such analysis, since any member’s (indirect) power index is simply obtained as 
the product of the two relevant power indices in the two stages, each of which is an 
independent probability. These absolute indices are then normalized to sum to one as 
before to provide a distribution of indirect voting power for this voting body. The 
theory is described in Leech and Leech (2006); the method in terms of game theory is 
presented in Owen (1995). 
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This method follows that proposed in Coleman (1973) to address the general 
question of why social actors give up power to join groups. By joining with others in 
a group, an actor gives up his power as an independent voter in favour of more limited 
power over group decisions, but may nevertheless gain overall if the group’s ‘power 
of combined forces’ is sufficiently greater that it offsets that loss of power. The use of 
power indices permits results to be obtained very easily since it allows us to combine 
the power of the actor within the group and the power of the group. Analytically this 
can be thought of as equivalent to a compound voting game. This approach lends 
itself naturally to the analysis of intergovernmental weighted voting where there is 
accountability to a lower body, such as a country’s electorate, parliament or a regional 
intergovernmental grouping. It can be generalized to compound voting games with 
three or more levels. It is a useful tool for the analysis of voting power implications of 
changes to the architecture of voting in the international institutions. We emphasise 
that such scenarios are very stylized and open to criticism for their realism. 
3. Weighted Voting in the IMF 
All countries are members of the Board of Governors, and as such have direct 
representation at the highest level of formal decision-making, but the real 
management is done by the Executive Directors (also known as the Executive Board).  
In the Board of Governors and in the election of Executive Directors the 
voting weight of each country is made up of two components: a fixed component of 
so-called ‘basic’ votes which is the same for each country, and a variable component 
that depends on the country’s quota. This formula for determining voting weight is 
intended as a compromise between two principles: the equal representation of 
member countries (via the basic votes), analogous to the UN General Assembly, and 
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voting power based on contributions in the manner of a joint stock company. Over 
time the basic element has become severely eroded and the quota - or share-based 
votes - have become dominant. This is an important factor behind the 
disempowerment of the poor countries. The restoration of the basic votes to their 
original level is a main aim of the reform movement. 
There are currently (in 2012) 188 members, of whom the USA has by far the 
largest voting weight, with 421,965 votes, 16.75 percent of the total, and the smallest 
is Tuvalu with 759 votes, 0.03 percent. The second-highest voting weight is held by 
Japan with 6.23 percent, Germany 5.81 percent, France and UK with 4.29 percent and 
so on.  
The Executive Board consists of 24 members, some of whom are appointed by 
their governments and some elected by member states. Five directors are appointed by 
the members with the largest quotas: USA, Japan, Germany, France and UK. The 
remaining 19 directors are elected.. 
In meetings when a vote is taken on an issue, the Executive Board uses 
weighted voting exactly like the Board of Governors: the appointed directors cast the 
number of votes of the member that appointed them, and the elected directors cast the 
combined number of votes of the countries that voted for them. There is no provision 
for executive directors to split their vote to reflect the views of the countries that 
voted for them, when they are not unanimous on the issue, although they are allowed 
to abstain, which in a sense is equivalent to splitting their voting weight equally and 
voting for both sides.  
There are elections for directors every two years. Each eligible member 
country votes for a single director and directors are elected in order of the number of 
 9 
votes they receive. The rules for electing directors lay down a minimum and 
maximum number of votes that can be cast for each elected director, and hence sizes 
of the weighted votes that they can cast at Executive Board meetings which prevent 
any elected director becoming too powerful. Eliminating ballots are taken until all the 
vacant directorships are filled.
 4
 
The result is a pattern of voting power generally similar to that of the 
governors.
5
 Three directors are elected by a single country, so are in effect appointed: 
China, Russia and Saudi Arabia. The rest are elected by groups of countries. 
A variety of decision rules are used for different types of decisions. Ordinary 
decisions are made by simple (weighted) majority of the votes cast (the quorum for 
meetings of the Board of Governors being a majority of members having not less than 
two-thirds of the voting weight; that for the Executive Board being a majority of 
directors having not less than one-half of the total voting weight). A number of 
matters require decisions to be taken by a supermajority of 85 percent. This 
supermajority, taken in conjunction with the weight of the USA, 16.75 percent, means 
that the USA is the only member that possesses a veto. 
It is customary for official spokespersons to say that decisions in the 
Executive are normally taken by consensus and formal votes are avoided. However 
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 The rules are laid down in Schedule E of the Articles of Association. They state that, 
in order to be elected, a director must receive at least four percent and no more than 
nine percent of the eligible votes. If the number of directors elected by this procedure 
is less than the number required, then there are further ballots with voting eligibility 
restricted to (i) those members who voted for a candidate who received less than four 
percent and (ii) those members who voted for a director who was elected but whose 
votes are deemed to have taken the votes for the director above nine percent.  
5
 The voting weights as proportions vary slightly between the Board of Governors and 
Executive Directors because of differences in participation in votes by countries with 
small weights. 
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this claim is not universally accepted, many writers pointing out that the absence of 
formal voting is not the same thing as consensus decision making.  In practice 
decision making during a debate where there is contention involves the secretary 
informally keeping a tally of the weighted votes held by the executive directors who 
speak on each side according to the sense of their contribution, a ‘consensus’ being 
deemed to have been found when the required majority has been reached. Thus 
although a formal vote is usually avoided, the rule may be closer to weighted majority 
voting than consensus building. See Buira (2005), Woods (2001). 
The American veto has always been an important aspect of the governance of 
the institutions, and continues to be so, the articles having been amended to increase 
the supermajority threshold for special decisions from 80 to 85 percent when the USA 
decided to reduce its quota. The existence of this veto power does not mean that the 
USA can be said to control the institutions, however. On the contrary, although it 
gives it absolute unilateral blocking power, at the same time it also limits that 
country’s power because it equally ensures a collective veto for small groups of other 
countries. Formally, in terms of Coleman’s terminology, while the supermajority rule 
gives the United States complete power to prevent action, it also limits its power to 
initiate action (Coleman, 1971). Therefore its voting power – and its power index 
(which is an average of these two) - is limited. The existence of the 85 percent 
supermajority can be seen to give veto power to three other countries acting together 
(for example, Japan, Germany and France). The developing countries, if they acted as 
a bloc, or the EU countries, or many other similar small groups, obviously have a 
veto
6
. The 85 percent rule tends to equalize voting power. Taking the argument to its 
                                                 
6
 This point about the difference between veto power and the power of control was 
made very clearly by Keynes in opposition to the proposed American veto based on 
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limit, the case of a unanimity rule (i.e. a supermajority requirement of 100 percent) 
would give every member a veto and equalise power, making voting weight 
irrelevant. For these reasons the power analysis in this study considers only ordinary 
decisions that require a simple majority vote. Analysis of power under supermajorities 
has been made in Leech (2002a). 
4. Voting Power in the Board of Governors 
Table 1 shows three analyses which reveal the weighted voting effect and give 
a picture of the effects of the quota reforms:  
(1) for 2006 before the reforms;  
(2) for 2008 after the ad hoc adjustments to the quotas for four emerging 
economies that were seriously out of line: China, Korea, Mexico and 
Turkey; and  
(3) for 2012, after the partial implementation7 of the reforms agreed in 2010.  
The table shows, for each of the main countries, (1) its relative voting weight 
and (2) its normalized power index or vote share
8
, in each of the years. Significant 
changes in weights in the reforms are highlighted in bold. The table also shows the 
Gini coefficient of inequality for both the voting weights and the voting power 
                                                                                                                                           
supermajorities in a speech to the House of Lords in 1943 when the Bretton Woods 
institutions were being planned. See Moggridge (1980), p. 278; also his Letter to J. 
Viner, p. 328. Keynes advocated simple majority voting. 
7
 Quotas change when countries make the payments, which not all have done at the 
time of writing. 
8
 These power indices have been calculated using the computer program ipmmle 
(accessible online at www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae) which implements the algorithm 
for computing power indices for voting bodies that are large both in having many 
members and where the voting weights are large numbers, described in Leech 
(2003a). For an overview of computing power indices see Leech (2002b). 
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indices. Inequality is very high in 2006 and the reforms reduce it by very little . 
Inequality in voting power is slightly higher than it is for weight. 
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Table 1. Voting Weights and Voting Powers in the Board of Governors  
(Largest weight countries)  
2006 2008 2012 
 Weight Power  Weight Power  Weight Power 
USA 17.09 24.49 USA 16.77 23.80 USA 16.75 24.29 
Japan 6.13 5.46 Japan  6.02 5.41 Japan 6.23 5.50 
Germany 5.99 5.35 Germany  5.88 5.30 Germany 5.81 5.18 
France 4.95 4.48 France  4.86 4.42 UK 4.29 3.89 
UK 4.95 4.48 UK 4.86 4.42 France 4.29 3.89 
Italy 3.25 2.97 China  3.66 3.35 China 3.81 3.46 
Saudi 3.22 2.94 Italy  3.19 2.93 Italy 3.16 2.88 
China 2.94 2.69 Saudi  3.16 2.90 Saudi  2.80 2.56 
Canada 2.94 2.69 Canada  2.89 2.65 Canada 2.56 2.34 
Russia 2.74 2.50 Russia  2.69 2.47 Russia 2.39 2.18 
Neth. 2.38 2.18 Neth.  2.34 2.15 India 2.34 2.14 
Belgium 2.13 1.95 Belgium  2.09 1.92 Neth. 2.08 1.90 
India 1.92 1.76 India  1.89 1.74 Belgium 1.86 1.70 
Switz. 1.60 1.46 Switz. 1.57 1.45 Brazil 1.72 1.57 
Australia 1.50 1.37 Australia  1.47 1.35 Spain 1.63 1.49 
Spain 1.41 1.29 Mexico  1.43 1.32 Mexico 1.47 1.35 
Brazil 1.41 1.29 Spain  1.39 1.28 Switz. 1.40 1.28 
Venezuela 1.23 1.13 Brazil  1.38 1.27 Korea 1.37 1.25 
Mexico 1.20 1.10 Korea  1.33 1.23 Australia 1.31 1.20 
Sweden 1.11 1.02 Venezuela 1.21 1.11 Venezuela 1.09 1.00 
Argentina 0.98 0.90 Sweden  1.09 1.01 Sweden 0.98 0.90 
Indonesia 0.97 0.89 Argentina  0.97 0.89 Argentina 0.87 0.80 
Austria 0.87 0.80 Indonesia  0.95 0.87 Austria 0.87 0.80 
S. Africa 0.87 0.80 Austria  0.86 0.79 Indonesia 0.86 0.79 
Nigeria 0.82 0.75 S. Africa  0.85 0.79 Denmark 0.78 0.71 
Norway 0.78 0.71 Nigeria 0.80 0.74 Norway 0.78 0.71 
Denmark 0.77 0.71 Norway  0.77 0.70 S. Africa 0.77 0.71 
Korea 0.76 0.70 Denmark  0.75 0.69 Malaysia 0.73 0.67 
Iran 0.70 0.64 Iran 0.69 0.63 Nigeria 0.73 0.67 
Malaysia 0.69 0.63 Malaysia  0.68 0.63 Poland 0.70 0.64 
Kuwait 0.65 0.60 Kuwait  0.63 0.58 Iran 0.62 0.57 
Ukraine 0.64 0.59 Ukraine  0.63 0.58 Turkey 0.61 0.56 
Poland 0.64 0.59 Poland  0.63 0.58 Thailand 0.60 0.55 
Finland 0.59 0.54 Finland  0.58 0.54 Singapore 0.59 0.54 
Algeria 0.59 0.54 Algeria  0.58 0.53 Kuwait 0.58 0.53 
Iraq 0.56 0.51 Turkey  0.55 0.51 Ukraine 0.57 0.52 
Libya 0.53 0.49 Iraq 0.55 0.50 Finland 0.53 0.49 
Thailand 0.51 0.47 Libya 0.52 0.48 Ireland 0.53 0.49 
Hungary 0.49 0.45 Thailand  0.50 0.46 Algeria 0.53 0.49 
Pakistan 0.49 0.45 Hungary  0.48 0.44 Iraq 0.50 0.46 
Romania 0.49 0.45 Pakistan  0.48 0.44 Libya 0.48 0.44 
Turkey 0.45 0.41 Romania  0.48 0.44 Greece 0.47 0.43 
… … … … … … … … … 
 100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00 
Gini  0.7780 0.7958  0.7819 0.7990  0.7584 0.7767 
Power indices have been calculated using the program ipmmle  available on the website 
www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae. 
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The table shows that the voting power of the United States is considerably out 
of line with its weight. In 2006 its voting weight of just over 17 percent gave it 24 
percent of the voting power. Its weight went down slightly in 2008 and again in 2012 
but it was still massively dominant giving it much greater voting power. All other 
members have less power than their weight. Thus we can say that the weighted voting 
system has a hidden tendency to enhance the power of the USA at the expense of all 
other countries. 
The 2006 table also brings out a number of glaring anomalies pointing to the 
need for reform. Canada and China had the same number of votes, and voting power, 
despite the economy of China being much bigger than that of Canada. This bias 
against developing countries is seen, also, in the comparison of the voting weight of 
some rich countries like Belgium, Netherlands and Spain with large emerging 
economies especially India, Brazil and Mexico. A particularly glaring juxtaposition is 
that between Denmark and Korea, the former having more voting weight than the 
latter despite its economy being much smaller than. 
The implications of the quota reforms are also illustrated in Figure 1 which 
shows the changes in voting power indices plotted against the changes in weights. 
The reforms have been in two stages: first the ad hoc increases for China, Korea, 
Mexico and Turkey implemented in 2008, then the changes resulting from the more 
radical reforms implemented in 2012. The latter reforms were:  (1) the introduction of 
a more transparent, simpler formula to replace the previous complicated five-fold 
system; (2) tying the quotas more closely to the formula; (3) tripling of basic votes for 
all members; (4) a second round of ad hoc increases for the four countries mentioned 
above. This second round of  reforms was accompanied by an increase in general 
 15 
quotas. The main changes in relative voting weights were increases for China, Korea, 
India, Brazil, Mexico and some others at the expense of the USA, some European 
countries notably the UK and France, Saudi Arabia and Canada.  None of the changes 
was greater than one percent of the total voting weight, so perhaps it is not surprising 
that the voting power effects are very small. 
Figure 1 shows a common pattern for all countries, except the two with the 
largest quotas. For all countries except the USA and Japan, the voting power change 
is proportional to the weight change; they all lie on a straight line through the origin 
with a gradient of less than 1. Those countries whose weight increases gain slightly 
less voting power while those whose weight falls lose less voting power. China gains 
0.87% in weight but only 0.78% in voting power, while the UK and France lose 
0.65% weight but only 0.58% voting power.  The exceptions are the USA and Japan 
which lie above and below the line respectively. Japan gains 0.1% in weight but only 
0.04% in voting power. The United States loses 0.32% weight but only 0.2% in 
voting power; it loses about the same voting weight as the Netherlands (0.30%) but 
does not lose comparable voting power (0.28%). These are unexpected weighted 
voting effects due to the great inequality in weights. 
However these effects are all small. They provide little to support the claim of 
the then IMF Managing Director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn that, “Taken together, it’s 
a big shift in quotas and accordingly in voting power. It’s a very important increase in 
the voice and representation of the emerging market and developing countries ... it is a 
historical reform of the IMF.”9 
                                                 
9
 Press Release: “IMF Board Approves Far-Reaching Governance Reforms”, 5 
November 2010, IMF Washington. 
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Figure 1: Voting power implications of the quota reforms  
 
Figure 2 shows the changes in voting power and weights that followed the ad 
hoc quota increases for the four countries implemented in 2006. These changes did 
not involve changes to the voting weights of the other members. The main effect was 
that the USA lost weight and power while China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey all 
gained. Interestingly the USA lost more in power (0.69%) than in weight (0.31%).  
The second phase of the reforms are shown in Figure 3, which compares 2008 with 
2012. Now we see that the USA gained in voting power (0.5%) as a result of the 
reforms although its relative weight hardly changed at all. The biggest gainers from 
this phase were India, Brazil and Spain, while the biggest losers were the UK and 
France. 
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Figure 2: The ad hoc increases in quota for China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey 
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Figure 3: The second phase of the quota reforms in 2012 
 
 
5. Voting Power in the Executive Board 
Table 2 shows the analyses, for 2006 and 2012,
10
 for the Executive Board, 
which has twenty four executive directors who cast weighted votes. The directors of 
the countries with the biggest five quotas (USA, Japan, Germany, UK and France) 
together with those of China, Russia and Saudi Arabia, are directly appointed by their 
governments and the rest are elected to represent other countries which are arranged 
into constituencies around the candidate they voted for. The table shows, for the 
country of each director, the number of countries it represents, its voting weight in the 
Executive Board, its voting power, and the ratio of power to weight. 
The USA dominates again but the inequality here, expressed by the Gini 
coefficient, is less than it is in the Board of Governors because most directors cast the 
                                                 
10
 We omit 2008 because the changes were so small. 
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combined votes of their constituency members. The power ratios show that all 
directors lose power to the USA and have less power than weight. The USA has 25 
percent more voting power than weight. There is a slight reduction in inequality 
between 2006 and 2012, the weight of the USA falling from 17.09 to 16.79 percent. 
Inequality of voting power is slightly greater, falling slightly, that of the USA falling 
from 21.45 to 20.95 percent. The Gini coefficient of the distribution of voting weight 
falls from 0.28 to 0.27 and that of the voting power indices from 0.317 to 0.304.  
In so far as direct comparisons are meaningful, the results are similar to those 
for the Governors. We can make direct comparisons of power indices for the directly 
appointed directors, but they are not so straightforward for the elected directors 
because it is necessary to take account of the power distribution within the 
constituency. Some of the constituency directors can be thought of in the same way as 
the appointed directors because they dominate their constituencies, and therefore have 
the absolute power to cast the combined votes. They are – to use the language of the 
voting power literature - technically dictators within their constituency.
11
 But others 
are elected and it is necessary to allow for the distribution of voting power within the 
constituency as well as the bloc vote cast by the elected director. We provide a fuller 
analysis of this feature of the Executive Board in section 6 below. Here we simply 
treat the Executive Board as a single weighted voting body. 
                                                 
11
 The constituencies are formed endogenously during the voting process: they have 
no objective status in the rules of the IMF.  Members are free to leave and join 
another constituency by voting for another candidate in the biennial election of the 
board. Although voting patterns and therefore constituency membership are stable 
over time, migrations do occur. For example Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both 
changed constituency between 2006 and 2012, the former moving from the Belgian to 
the Swiss constituency, the latter from the Swiss to the Australasian constituency. 
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Table 3 shows the analysis for the 16 directors who represent a constituency 
with more than one member. The table shows, for the country of each director, for 
2006 and 2012, its voting weight as a member of the Board of Governors, its voting 
weight as an executive director (the combined weight of all its constituency members) 
and the difference. The countries are ordered by the difference, which measures the 
gain in voting weight due to the constituency system. The table also includes the 
voting power of the country in its constituency assuming an election by simple 
majority vote (columns (3) and (6))
12. Countries which are ‘dictators’ in their 
constituency have a voting power of 100 per cent. 
The results show the countries that gain most in voting weight by the 
constituency system: Mexico (casting the votes of Venezuela, Spain and the Central 
American republics), Belgium (representing ten east European countries including 
Austria, Turkey, Hungary), Finland (representing the Nordic group), Tanzania 
(representing the Anglophone African group), and so on. In all constituencies where 
there is a member with over half the votes, and is a ‘dictator’, that member is always 
elected (Switzerland, Brazil, Italy, Canada, India). The gain in  voting power is less in 
these cases simply because their voting power is high anyway. Where there is a 
member who is dominant in the constituency, such as the Netherlands (voting power 
index in the constituency 98.9 percent in 2006, 89.1 in 2012), Belgium (voting power 
68.0 percent and 53.0 percent, respectively), Argentina (75 percent) it is elected 
although not technically a ‘dictator’. Other constituencies operate a more open system 
of representation, with different countries providing the elected executive director (for 
example, the Nordic, Anglophone/Lusophone African and Francophone African 
constituencies). These conclusions are drawn from the observed voting weights and 
                                                 
12
 Normalised Banzhaf index. 
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not from analysis of the operation of the constituencies in practice, which exist 
outside the formal rules of the IMF, and have adopt their own procedures. 
The main result for the Executive Board is the same as for the Board of 
Governors: a strong tendency for weighted voting to enhance the voting power of the 
United States at the expense of all the other directors. The effect is not so great: here 
the ratio of voting power to voting weight for the USA is 1.248, showing that the 
USA gains a hidden extra share of voting power of almost 25 percent more than its 
weight, compared with 45 percent in the Board of Governors in 2012.  
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Table 2. Voting Weights and Voting Powers in the Executive Directors 
 2006 2012 
 
 No. 
Voting 
weight 
(%) 
Voting 
power 
(%) 
Ratio  No. 
Voting 
weight 
(%) 
Voting 
power 
(%) 
Ratio 
1 USA 1 17.09 21.45 1.255 USA 1 16.79 20.95 1.248 
2 Japan 1 6.13 5.82 0.949 Japan 1 6.25 5.95 0.952 
3 Germany 1 5.99 5.69 0.949 Germany 1 5.82 5.55 0.952 
4 Belgium 10 5.13 4.87 0.948 Belgium 10 4.98 4.74 0.951 
5 France 1 4.95 4.69 0.948 Mexico 8 4.66 4.43 0.951 
6 UK 1 4.95 4.69 0.948 Nether. 13 4.53 4.30 0.950 
7 Neth. 12 4.85 4.59 0.948 France 1 4.30 4.09 0.950 
8 Mexico 8 4.27 4.05 0.948 UK 1 4.30 4.09 0.950 
9 Italy 7 4.18 3.96 0.948 Italy 7 4.27 4.06 0.951 
10 Canada 12 3.71 3.51 0.947 Singapore 13 3.94 3.75 0.950 
11 Finland 8 3.51 3.32 0.947 China 1 3.82 3.63 0.949 
12 Korea 14 3.33 3.15 0.947 Australia 15 3.63 3.45 0.950 
13 Egypt 13 3.26 3.08 0.947 Canada 12 3.61 3.43 0.950 
14 SaudiAr. 1 3.22 3.05 0.946 Denmark 8 3.41 3.23 0.949 
15 Malaysia 12 3.17 3.00 0.946 Lesotho 21 3.23 3.06 0.950 
16 Tanzania 19 3.00 2.84 0.947 Egypt 13 3.19 3.03 0.949 
17 China 1 2.94 2.78 0.946 India 4 2.81 2.67 0.949 
18 Switz. 8 2.84 2.69 0.946 Brazil 9 2.81 2.67 0.949 
19 Russia 1 2.74 2.60 0.946 SaudiAr. 1 2.81 2.67 0.949 
20 Iran 7 2.47 2.33 0.946 Switz. 8 2.78 2.64 0.949 
21 Brazil 9 2.47 2.33 0.946 Russia 1 2.39 2.27 0.949 
22 India 4 2.40 2.27 0.946 Iran 7 2.27 2.15 0.947 
23 Argentina 6 1.99 1.89 0.945 Argentina 6 1.84 1.75 0.947 
24 Equ.Guinea 24 1.41 1.34 0.945 Togo 22 1.55 1.47 0.947 
 Total 181 100.00 100.00   184 100.00 100.00  
 Gini   0.280 0.317    0.270 0.304  
 Power indices have been calculated using the method of generating functions using the program 
ipgenf  on the website www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae.  
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Table 3.  Elected Executive Directors’ votes 
2006 2012 
 
 
Weight 
(%) 
ED wt. 
(%
) 
diff Const. VP 
(%) 
 
 
Weight 
(%
) 
ED wt 
(%) diff 
Const.VP 
(%) 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
Mexico 1.2 4.27 3.07 33.3 Singapore 0.59 3.94 3.35 15.1 
Belgium 2.13 5.13 3.00 68.0 Mexico 1.47 4.66 3.19 33.3 
Finland 0.59 3.51 2.92 13.7 Lesotho 0.04 3.23 3.19 1.5 
Tanzania 0.1 3 2.9 4.3 Belgium 1.86 4.98 3.12 53.0 
Egypt 0.45 3.26 2.81 12.9 Egypt 0.4 3.19 2.79 12.9 
Korea 0.76 3.33 2.57 13.3 Denmark 0.78 3.41 2.63 25.0 
Malaysia 0.69 3.17 2.48 18.8 Netherlands 2.08 4.53 2.45 89.1 
Netherlands 2.38 4.85 2.47 98.9 Australia 1.31 3.63 2.32 29.4 
Iran 0.7 2.47 1.77 32.1 Iran 0.62 2.27 1.65 32.1 
Equ.Guinea 0.03 1.41 1.38 1.8 Togo 0.06 1.55 1.49 3.7 
Switzerland 1.6 2.84 1.24 100 Switzerland 1.4 2.78 1.38 100 
Brazil 1.41 2.47 1.06 100 Italy 3.16 4.27 1.11 100 
Argentina 0.98 1.99 1.01 75.0 Brazil 1.72 2.81 1.09 100 
Italy 3.25 4.18 0.93 100 Canada 2.56 3.61 1.05 100 
Canada 2.94 3.71 0.77 100 Argentina 0.87 1.84 0.97 75.0 
India 1.92 2.4 0.48 100 India 2.34 2.81 0.47 100 
Columns (1) and (4) are the country’s weight share, (2) and (5) the combined constituency weight share of all 
countries in the constituency, the votes that the executive director casts, (3) and (6) voting power shares of the 
country within the constituency. 
 
 
6.  The Executive Board as a Representative Democratic Body 
Executive directors have a dual role: on the one hand they are professional 
officers of the IMF who are permanently based in Washington, experts charged with 
designing and implementing policies that are supposed to be technically objective and 
politically neutral, and on the other they are either appointed or elected by member 
countries and therefore political representatives or delegates. The latter set of roles are 
our concern in this section: our focus is on the power relations between member 
countries. 
Although the Articles prescribe a set of formal rules for electing directors, 
which do not mention constituencies at all, in practice the constituencies are a real 
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force. There are no formally laid down rules governing the relationships between 
directors and their constituents that we can study. But in practice those member 
countries which do not have the right to appoint their own director are arranged into 
geographical groupings, whose members vote for the executive director who 
represents them. It is therefore natural to treat them as constituencies, since they are 
defined by the fact of the members voting for the executive director who casts their 
votes on their behalf. 
Many of the constituencies have a powerful dominant member whose director 
is invariably elected - not least because (in five cases) his or her country has an 
absolute majority of the constituency votes - and so in effect these have become 
permanent board members. In these cases the other constituency members have no 
voting power in relation to the Executive Board. Two other constituencies have a 
practically dominant member who is not technically a dictator: those represented by 
Belgium and Netherlands. The other nine constituencies have no single dominant 
member and the chair rotates or changes otherwise. 
In the discussion of the IMF it is customary to refer to the constituencies as if 
they operated just like any other in a representative democracy. Spokesmen for the 
IMF often refer to constituencies in these terms. Directors meet their constituencies at 
the annual IMF/World Bank meetings.  
However there appears to be an issue of democratic legitimacy when one 
reads in the authoritative work on the governance of the IMF: “When members 
belonging to a given constituency hold different views on a subject, the executive 
director can put differing views on record but cannot split his or her vote. The 
resolution of such conflicts is for each director to decide and any director remains free 
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to record an abstention or an objection to a particular decision. The system has a 
tempering impact and evidence shows that the decisions that finally result may well 
be the best that could be taken under the circumstances” (Van Houtven, 2002).  
We can distinguish two types of constituencies in terms of their composition 
by types of countries that make them up. Seven are mixed industrial, middle income 
and developing or transitional countries and nine are developing countries. Many of 
them, especially the mixed groups, have a member with a very large weight, usually 
an industrial country, which is dominant within the group and whose representative is 
invariably elected. Some constituencies have different arrangements for selecting 
their director and the office rotates; this may be the case where there is no one 
member who is dominant in terms of weight, such as the Nordic-Baltic constituency 
and also the two African constituencies; alternatively there may be two or three 
relatively dominant members among whom the office rotates but excluding the 
smaller members, for example the Mexican-Venezuelan-Spanish group where there 
are three dominant members.  
The Articles do contain one explicit provision for majority voting within 
constituencies: the procedure for a by-election for an executive director when there is 
a casual vacancy. The members of the relevant constituency elect the replacement 
director, by a simple majority of the votes cast, using eliminating ballots if 
necessary.
13
 There has been at least one case where a constituency has actually 
elected its director by open voting. The Middle Eastern constituency in the IMF, 
which includes Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait and ten other Arab countries, has selected its 
executive director by open election between candidates from different countries. We 
                                                 
13
 Article XII, Section 3 (f), and By-Law 17. 
 26 
therefore consider it is of interest and appropriate to investigate the voting power of 
the member countries using voting power analysis on the stylized model of 
representative democracy suggested by the constituency structure. 
The first result of this analysis is that five members are formally ‘dictators’ 
within their constituency, all the other members are powerless. This applies to the 
constituencies of Italy, Canada, Switzerland, Brazil and India. Those countries which 
are rendered powerless, in the sense that their a priori voting power is zero, are 
referred to in the voting power and game theory literature as technically dummies. 
Uzbekistan was a ‘dummy’ in 2006 when it was a member of the constituency 
represented by Switzerland, but ceased to be so in 2012 when it had moved to the 
constituency represented by Australia; Kazakhstan became a ‘dummy’ when it moved 
from having voting power as a member of the constituency represented by Belgium in 
2006 to that represented by Switzerland in 2012. 
The fact that countries are ‘dummies’ when there is a ‘dictator’ is perhaps not 
a surprising finding. However we have discovered that some countries have zero 
voting power although their constituencies do not have a dictator. This finding is 
illustrative of the value of the voting power approach because it is not obvious and 
could not have been discovered any other way. The countries are Estonia in 2006, and 
the five Central American countries, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua. That the latter five countries are dummies follows from the fact that 
their constituency has three large members, Spain, Mexico, Venezuela, any two of 
which are needed to form a majority, which implies that none of the other five 
members can ever be decisive. However the finding that Estonia was a ‘dummy’ in 
the Nordic constituency is not at all obvious. It is a property of the voting weight the 
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country receives by virtue of its quota. Note that Estonia has positive voting power by 
2012 following the quota reforms. 
Therefore in 2006 there were in total 42 member countries (23 percent of the 
membership), with zero voting power with respect to the Executive Board, in 
possession of some 4.19 percent of the voting weight. The reforms made little 
difference to this: by 2012 the number had fallen to 41 with slightly more, 5.55%, of 
the weight. These countries include some industrial countries but in the main they are 
developing countries. They are: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia (2006), Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan (2012), Kyrgyz Republic, 
Malta, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-
Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (2006). The six ‘dummies’ 
with the largest weight are Poland, Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Colombia, Bangladesh. 
We now analyse the voting power of every member by considering the 
Executive Board as a two-level representative body. Each member’s voting power is 
the product of voting power in two voting bodies: its power with respect to decisions 
taken by simple majority voting among constituency members within the 
constituency, and the power of the constituency in the Executive Board under simple 
majority voting. A member’s power index is obtained by multiplying together these 
two Penrose indices
14
.  
                                                 
14
 The absolute (that is, non-normalised) power indices, which are probabilities, are 
used for this calculation. The normalised indices are then computed.  
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It is of interest to use this technique to investigate which members gain and 
which lose power in the Executive Board as a result of the way the constituency 
system is assumed to work, compared with their power in the Board of Governors. 
This comparison assumes away the differences in competence of the two bodies and 
focuses only the structural effects of the constituency groupings on formal voting 
power. Obviously the members who have been shown to be powerless in their 
constituencies are losers. However it is not clear that the countries that dominate their 
constituencies, including the ‘dictators’, necessarily gain since it depends on the 
power of their constituency.  
Table 4 gives some results of this analysis. Only the results for the most 
powerful countries are presented. The power indices for the Board of                            
Governors, from Table 1, are also presented as the basis of comparison with the 
indices for the two-level voting structure we have assumed. For each year the 
countries are ordered by their two-stage indirect voting power index. From these 
results we can infer that, in 2006, the countries that most benefited from the 
constituency system – that is with both a large indirect voting power index and with 
its indirect power index greater than its direct (the Board of Governors) power index - 
are the Netherlands (3.76% compared with 2.18%), Belgium (a very large increase: 
3.69% compared with 1.95%), Italy, Canada, Switzerland. The same pattern was 
repeated in 2012. 
Table 5 shows the biggest gainers and losers from the constituency system in 
terms of voting power. Here the countries are ordered by gain or loss, that is the 
difference between two-stage indirect power index for the Executive Board and the 
direct power index for the Board of Governors (labelled VP). The biggest gainers are 
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the rich smaller European countries especially Belgium and the Netherlands. The 
biggest losers tend to be the countries that appoint their own Directors: the USA, 
Japan, Germany, UK, France. By 2012 China had become big enough for this effect 
to apply to it. The biggest losers also include ‘dummy’ countries Poland and Ireland. 
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Table 4. Voting power indices for the Executive Board as a democratic 
representative body (two-stage voting) 
(Most powerful countries) 
 
2006 2012 
 
Weight 
(%) 
2-stage 
VP  
(%) 
BGVP 
(%)  
Weight 
(%) 
2-
stageVP 
(%) 
BGVP 
(%) 
USA 17.09 17.57 24.49 USA 16.79 16.46 24.29 
Japan 6.13 4.77 5.46 Japan 6.25 4.68 5.50 
Germany 5.99 4.66 5.35 Germany 5.82 4.36 5.18 
France 4.95 3.84 4.48 Nether. 2.08 3.33 1.90 
UK 4.95 3.84 4.48 France 4.30 3.21 3.89 
Nether. 2.38 3.76 2.18 UK 4.30 3.21 3.89 
Belgium 2.13 3.69 1.95 Italy 3.17 3.19 2.88 
Italy 3.25 3.25 2.97 Belgium 1.86 3.13 1.70 
Canada 2.94 2.88 2.69 China 3.82 2.85 3.46 
SaudiArab 3.22 2.50 2.94 Canada 2.56 2.70 2.34 
China 2.94 2.28 2.69 India 2.35 2.10 2.14 
Switz. 1.60 2.20 1.46 Brazil 1.72 2.10 1.57 
Russia 2.74 2.13 2.50 SaudiArab 2.81 2.09 2.56 
Australia 1.50 2.04 1.37 Switz. 1.41 2.07 1.28 
Sweden 1.11 1.95 1.02 Russia 2.39 1.79 2.18 
Brazil 1.41 1.91 1.29 Spain 1.63 1.74 1.49 
India 1.92 1.86 1.76 Mexico 1.47 1.74 1.35 
Spain 1.41 1.66 1.29 Venez. 1.09 1.74 1.00 
Venez. 1.23 1.66 1.13 Sweden 0.98 1.47 0.90 
Mexico 1.20 1.66 1.10 Korea 1.37 1.41 1.25 
… … … … … … … … 
BGVP: Voting power in  the Board of Governors (normalised Banzhaf index) ; 2-stage 
VP: normalised voting power index for idealised two-level voting in the Executive 
Board.. 
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Table 5. Voting power indices for the Executive Board as a democratic 
representative body (two-stage voting) 
(Biggest gainers and losers) 
2006 2012 
Gainers: 
 
2-stage 
VP 
(%) 
BGVP 
(%) Diff. 
 2_stage 
VP 
(%) 
BGVP 
(%) Diff. 
Belgium 3.69 1.95 1.74 Netherlands 3.33 1.90 1.43 
Netherlands 3.76 2.18 1.58 Belgium 3.13 1.70 1.42 
Sweden 1.95 1.02 0.94 New Zeal. 1.30 0.35 0.94 
Indonesia 1.63 0.89 0.74 Switzerland 2.07 1.29 0.79 
Switzerland 2.20 1.46 0.74 Venezuela 1.74 1.00 0.74 
Australia 2.04 1.37 0.67 South Africa 1.30 0.71 0.59 
Brazil 1.91 1.29 0.62 Indonesia 1.38 0.78 0.59 
Kuwait 1.17 0.60 0.57 Sweden 1.47 0.90 0.57 
Mexico 1.66 1.10 0.56 Brazil 2.10 1.57 0.52 
Losers: 
Austria 0.30 0.80 -0.50 Ireland 0.00 0.49 -0.49 
Ukraine 0.00 0.59 -0.58 China 2.85 3.47 -0.62 
Poland 0.00 0.59 -0.59 Poland 0.00 0.64 -0.64 
France 3.84 4.48 -0.63 France 3.21 3.90 -0.68 
UK 3.84 4.48 -0.63 UK 3.21 3.90 -0.68 
Germany 4.66 5.35 -0.69 Germany 4.36 5.19 -0.83 
Japan 4.77 5.46 -0.69 Japan 4.68 5.51 -0.83 
USA 17.57 24.49 -6.92 USA 16.46 24.33 -7.87 
BGVP: Voting power in  the Board of Governors (normalised Banzhaf index) ; 2-stage 
VP: normalised voting power index for idealised two-level voting in the Executive 
Board.. 
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Table 6. Biggest gainers and losers in voting power 2006-12 
Gainers Losers 
 VP2012 VP2006 Diff.  VP2012 VP2006 Diff. 
Governors 
China 3.47 2.69 0.786 Nether. 1.90 2.18 -0.272 
Korea 1.25 0.70 0.556 Russia 2.19 2.50 -0.316 
India 2.14 1.76 0.386 Canada 2.34 2.69 -0.345 
Brazil 1.57 1.29 0.283 SaudiArab. 2.56 2.94 -0.376 
Mexico 1.35 1.10 0.248 France 3.90 4.48 -0.577 
Spain 1.49 1.29 0.200 UK 3.90 4.48 -0.577 
Executive Board 
China 3.63 2.78 0.845 Nether. 4.30 4.59 -0.292 
Sing./Mal. 3.75 3.00 0.743 Russia 2.27 2.60 -0.325 
India 2.67 2.27 0.402 SaudiArab 2.67 3.05 -0.385 
Mexico 4.43 4.05 0.377 USA 20.95 21.45 -0.505 
Brazil 2.67 2.33 0.335 UK 4.09 4.69 -0.605 
Austr./Kor. 3.45 3.15 0.302 France 4.09 4.69 -0.605 
Executive Board as a representative body (2-stage voting) 
Korea 1.41 0.54 0.863 Congo,Rep 0.14 0.67 -0.532 
New Zeal. 1.30 0.54 0.754 Belgium 3.13 3.69 -0.566 
China 2.85 2.28 0.572 France 3.21 3.84 -0.630 
Congo,DR 0.63 0.11 0.526 UK 3.21 3.84 -0.630 
Singapore 0.92 0.50 0.420 Australia 1.31 2.04 -0.730 
Malaysia 1.17 0.83 0.342 USA 16.46 17.57 -1.108 
 
7. Conclusions 
We have used the method of voting power analysis and power indices to 
analyse the voting system by which the IMF is governed and the recent reforms that 
have been made to it. We argue, and hopefully have demonstrated, that this approach 
provides valuable insights that help us better understand weighted voting systems. 
The results for the voting power implications of the recent reforms are summarized in 
Table 6 
We report three analyses of the reforms: first, their effect on the voting power 
relations in the Board of Governors, where all member countries have a voice; 
second, their implications for the distribution of voting power in the Executive Board 
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among the 24 countries that are members of that body; and third, their implications 
for voting power with respect to representation on the Executive Board, where it is 
regarded formally as a delegate body using a two-stage voting procedure. The 
principal finding, from the first analysis, is that the voting power share of the United 
States is always substantially much more than its weight, while for all other members, 
their voting power shares are slightly lower than their weights. Not only is the 
allocation of voting weight very unfair from the point of view of an ideal of  “One 
person, One vote”, with many large developing countries and emerging markets 
seriously under-represented, but this bias is compounded by the inequality in the 
distribution of weights and the voting rules. 
Table 6 reports the six biggest gainers and six biggest losers in terms of voting 
power shares for each of these three analyses. First, while the biggest gainers from the 
reforms in the Board of Governors are the emerging markets including China, Korea, 
India, Brazil and Mexico, the effects are quite small: for example the largest increase 
is that for China which is less than one percent of the total voting power. These 
increases are mainly at the expense of the voting power of some of the industrial 
countries including the biggest losers UK, France, Canada, and the Netherlands. All 
these effects are small which suggests that the reforms do not live up to some of the 
claims that have been made for them.  
The second analysis is of the changes in the Executive Board. Again the 
biggest gainers are the emerging markets, China, India, Mexico, Brazil and the South- 
East Asian constituency represented either by Singapore or Malaysia. The biggest 
losers in voting power are the large industrial countries, this time including the USA. 
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The third analysis, of changes to voting power of member countries in relation 
to the Executive as a delegate body, shows more mixed results, with the biggest 
gainers being Korea, New Zealand and China, and the biggest losers the USA, 
Australia, the UK and France. All these effects are small however, and the overall 
conclusion must be that the reforms are insubstantial. 
The results for the idealized two-level voting system we have assumed for the 
Executive Board and its constituencies suggest that such a system tends strongly to 
benefit the smaller developed European countries, notably Belgium and the 
Netherlands.. Also, from this point of view, almost a quarter of all members, mostly 
small developing countries, are completely powerless.  
These results point to a serious limitation in the democratic legitimacy of the 
governance of the institution. The recent quota reforms, while claimed as being a 
major step towards improving the voice and representation of the poor countries and 
emerging economies are nothing of the sort. The changes are very small and give no 
cause for celebration. 
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